Tag Archive: collateral shortage

The Biggest Risk, No Surprise, Collateral

2022-06-28

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2022-06-28

It’s not just the 4-week T-bill rate which is defying the Fed’s illusion of control, though that’s where the incidents are most evident. The front bill is nowhere close to the official RRP “floor” which can only mean one thing: collateral shortage, a large and persistent liquidity premium.

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RRP (use) Hits $2T, SOFR Like T-bills Below RRP (rate), What Is (really) Going On?

2022-05-27

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2022-05-27

You might not know it, but front-end T-bill yields are not the only market spaces which are making a mockery of the Federal Reserve’s “floor.” There are others, including the same money number the same Fed demanded the world (or whatever banks in its jurisdiction it could threaten) ditch LIBOR over.

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Yield Curve Inversion Was/Is Absolutely All About Collateral

2022-04-18

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2022-04-18

If there was a compelling collateral case for bending the Treasury yield curve toward inversion beginning last October, what follows is the update for the twist itself. As collateral scarcity became shortage then a pretty substantial run, that was the very moment yield curve flattening became inverted.Just like October, you can actually see it all unfold.

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The Fed Inadvertently Adds To Our Ironclad Collateral Case Which Does Seem To Have Already Included A ‘Collateral Day’ (or days)

2022-03-21

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2022-03-21

The Federal Reserve didn’t just raise the range for its federal funds target by 25 bps, upper and lower bounds, it also added the same to its twin policy tools which the “central bank” says are crucial to maintaining order in money markets thereby keeping federal funds inside the band where it is supposed to be. The FOMC voted to increase IOER from 15 bps to 40 bps, and the RRP from 5 bps to 30 bps.

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There Is An Absolutely Solid Collateral Case For What’s Driving Curve Inversion(s) [Part 2]

2022-03-18

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2022-03-18

Securities lending as standard practice is incredibly complicated, and for many the process can be counterintuitive. With numerous different players contributing various pieces across a wide array of financial possibilities, not to mention the whole expanse of global geography, collateral for collateral swaps have gone largely unnoticed by even mainstream Economics and central banking.

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There Is An Absolutely Solid Collateral Case For What’s Driving Curve Inversion(s) [Part 1]

2022-03-17

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2022-03-17

With the 7s10s already inverted, and the 5s today mere bps away, making a macro case for the distortion isn’t too difficult. Despite China’s “upside” economic data today, even the Chinese are talking more about their downside worries (shooting/hoping for “stability”) than strength. In the US or Europe, no matter the CPIs in either place there are cyclical (not just inventory) warning signs all over the place.

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The FOMC Accidentally Exposes Itself (Reverse Repo-style)

2021-06-18

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2021-06-18

UST Yield Curve, Mar 2021 - Jun 2021
Initially, the dots got all the attention. Though these things are beyond hopeless, the media needs them to write up its account of a more fruitful monetary policy outcome because markets continue to discount that entirely.

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Deja Vu: Treasury Shorts Meet Treasury Shortages

2021-03-10

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2021-03-10

UST Yield Curve, 2013
Investors like to short bonds, even Treasuries, as much as they might stocks and their ilk. It should be no surprise that profit-maximizing speculators will seek the best risk-adjusted returns wherever and whenever they might perceive them.

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Treasury Auctions Are Anything But Sorry Because They’ve Never Been Sorry About Solly

2020-11-28

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2020-11-28

US TIC, 2010-2020
Twenty years ago, in November 2000, the Treasury Department changed one aspect of the way the government would sell its own debt. Auctions of these and other kinds of securities had been ongoing for decades, back to the twenties, and they had been transformed many times along the way. In the middle of the 1970’s Great Inflation, for example, Treasury gradually phased out all other means for issuing securities, by 1977 relying exclusively on...

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